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I. Introduction
The development of a proper screening model for competition policy has gained in importance over the last years, especially with respect to price collusion. Although the European Commission has not dealt with many cases, between 2004 and 2011 competition authorities in Europe carried out over one hundred market-monitoring actions, about 1,300 merger cases, and 180 antitrust cases -half of which were cartels. 1 The aim of this paper is to develop an empirical model that consistently measures shifts in price variation, which can be used by antitrust authorities for screening purposes. The approach can also be useful as an additional technique for establishing damages in antitrust legal proceedings concerning price fixing agreements.
Previous findings have shown that collusive behavior can be detected by analyzing empirical data. In this context, Sherwin and Stigler (1985) , Bolotova et al. (2008) , Böckers et al. (2011) , Geist (2009, 2011) analyze price dispersion. Blanckenburg et al. (2012) compare the distribution of price changes between collusive and non-collusive periods for eleven major cartels. They found that 9 out of 11 cartels were successful in controlling the market price for a number of years. However, the presented cases were already prosecuted by the European antitrust authority.
In this paper, we present a model to detect an unknown suspicion of a collusive period.
A general requirement is to adapt an appropriate method that screens time series data independently. The model is illustrated by applying it for German energy markets due to the fact that on these markets, collusion periods can be supposed in the past. In order to simplify the understanding of the developed methodology, we provide a short example and a market simulation. In this exemplary analysis, we assume a typical power market, where supplier may be able to manipulate prices. We simulate time series for different manipulation scenarios and show how our empirical approach works.
II. Requirement of screening models
A typical framework for analysing market power in industrial organization is to estimate structural models in order to gain an impression about the degree of competition in certain markets. Heijnen et al. (2012) develop, for example, a method to identify statistical evidence of clustering of outlets that score high on some characteristic that is consistent with collusive behavior. Harrington (2005 Harrington ( , 2008 mentions requirements for systematic and ubiquitous market screenings. Evidence of collusive patterns must be discernible by just looking at the available data, such as prices. The procedure should be automatable so that it can be carried out with minimal human input. However, for many markets exact and reliable data are notoriously difficult to obtain.
Market manipulations lead to multiple changes in industry structure and behavior.
Stigler (1964) states that price dispersion is ubiquitous, even for homogenous products. It takes place when different suppliers offer different prices for the same good on a certain market. Several studies, including Carlson and McAfee (1983), Carlton (1986) demonstrate that price dispersion is greater when industry concentration declines. Furthermore, according to Connor (2005) , cartels usually fix prices either by announcing list prices to buyers and agreeing to sell only at this price or by agreeing to sell at some lower "floor" (minimum) price or at a "target" (average) price below list. Some cartels also agree to eliminate or restrict discounts, which reduces the variance of prices. There is some empirical support for this hypothesis. Abrantes-Metz et al. (2006) examine the effects of a bid-rigging cartel in frozen perch sold to the U.S. Department of Defence. As a result, they find a relatively small difference in price, but a huge difference in variance, when comparing the collusive and competitive regimes. The average price dropped 23% after the conspiracy was detected, but even more significant, the variance of price increased by 145%, compared to the variance during the cartel period. For the lysine cartel, Bolotova et al. (2008) find support for the hypotheses that the mean increases and the variance decreases in the cartel period relative to the competitive regimes. Citric acid prices examined in that study confirm the mean price hypothesis, but fail to support the variance hypothesis. The variance was even higher as compared to the pre-cartel and post-cartel periods. Blanckenburg and Geist (2009) However, a robust screening needs adequate data and methods.
III. An empirical approach to detect inconsistencies
This section describes an empirical approach to detection of the cartel periods. The idea is that by analyzing the distribution of the growth rates of price for a product in two different time intervals we can judge whether the price setting for this product in each of the sub-periods has a different nature and which of the sub-periods can be characterized as a free competition or a cartel phase. A natural idea would be to compare the moments (say, mean or variance) of two distributions in order to tell them apart. However, as shown in Blanckenburg et al. (2012) , none of the first four moments of the distribution, with an exception perhaps of variance, can be considered as a robust indicator allowing to distinguish between competition and cartel. In fact, a comparison of the whole distributions in each sub-period is needed.
Therefore, we suggest to employ the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, which is a nonparametric (distribution-free) test comparing two distributions. In fact, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov D-statistic measures a distance between the empirical distribution functions of two samples. The null hypothesis of the test states that both samples are drawn from the same distribution. Formally, the test statistic is defined as follows:
where F 0 (P t ) and F 1 (P t ) are the empirical cumulative distribution functions constructed for each of the two samples being compared; and ΔP t is the variable of price changes in period t.
In words, the empirical cumulative distribution functions are compared (as absolute differences of function values) in each point of distribution support and then the largest absolute difference is taken as the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistic. When this supremum's absolute difference exceeds certain critical value, the null hypothesis of two samples being drawn from the same distribution is rejected.
The empirical density functions were obtained using the Gaussian kernel. The smoothing bandwidth for this kernel is computed using the following rule-of-thumb:
where σ is the standard deviation; IQR is the interquartile range; and T is the sample size. All computations are made using the programming language R.
In fact, this question setting is equivalent to that of structural break, or regime switching detection. For instance, a period of free competition is succeeded by a cartel period, which represents a structural break or change in regime. Our task is to determine the timing of the structural break, which is typically unknown. As a matter of fact, six following situations are possible: 1) all the time competition; 2) all the time cartel; 3) first competition, then cartel; 4) first competition, then cartel, then again competition; 5) first cartel, then competition; and 6) first cartel, then competition, then again cartel. The most interesting case is 3), when we are actually trying to detect an existing cartel. The last situation is probably the least likely one, especially when the sample is short. Thus, we may have between 0 and 2 breakpoints.
Similarly to the standard structural break tests with unknown break point (e.g., suplikelihood-ratio and sup-Wald tests described in Andrews, 1993) we need to run a sequence of KS-tests over rolling sub-periods (windows). However, in our case in addition to the breakpoint, , we need to estimate also the length of window, w. Thus, the cartel phase, if any, is then defined given a combination of  and w, for which the maximum KS-statistic exceeding the critical value is attained. Formally:
where D  is the KS test statistic, which compares the distributions of price changes in two sub-periods: 1) cartel-suspected sub-period 2, 1 and 2) the union of sub-periods before and after cartel-suspected sub-period 2, 1 ∪ 2, .
Thus, if * and w* exist, then the cartel phase is defined as the time interval * * 2, * 1 .
The decision on accepting or rejecting the null hypothesis is made based on the pvalues corresponding to the Kolmogorov-Smirnov D-statistic. These are computed using bootstrap with the number of samples equal to 1000.
A possible further development of the cartel testing technique can be supplementing the price information by the data on capacity utilization. In that case, a multivariate version of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test could be used. This would allow comparing the joint distribution of prices and, for instance, capacity utilization and better identifying the cartels, since not only the behavior of the prices but also their relationship with quantity can change under cartel.
IV. A short example and simulation results
In this section, a short example of how manipulations can occur and how we are able to detect them will be introduced. In anticipation of the empirical section we choose a setup describing a common power market where supplier may be able to cause price inconstancies in order to gain market power. For this setup, we present four simulation scenarios and demonstrate how our empirical approach works.
Imagine a typical power market, where pricing underlie particular terms. It is not possible to store the generated power efficiently. As result, the storage of power is only possible for a marginal size. Consequently, power generation and the actual demand have to match. As a consequence, every hourly spot price is the pricing of a single product. The price of every hourly output is determined by the marginal costs of the last power plant that is needed to satisfy the demand. Figure 1 illustrates this principle. For more detail on this mechanism see, e. g., Sensfuß et al. (2008) . When demand is equal to 14 MWh/h (vertical line), the market price will be 15 €/MWh/h. In order to meet the demand all hydro-, wind-and photovoltaic power plants must be put into operation. Moreover, additional 4 MWh/h must be generated by the nuclear power plants.
Since the nuclear power plants are the last plants that will be needed to satisfy demand, the marginal costs of these plants determine the market price. In this manner, the companies can exploit their market power as well as influence the market price and so they are able to obtain economic advantages. In order to demonstrate the usefulness of the screening technique explained in section III we use the following scenario.
We stick to the aforementioned pool of power plants (see Figure 1) and approximate the supply function through a quadratic function. We concentrate on a time period of one year (365 days). For the sake of simplicity we take daily prices instead of hourly prices. The demand is modeled dynamically and underlies random variations. In every time period a market price is available. We will show the application of our approach with and without exploitation of market power for the following three cases. First of all we investigate the base scenario a). As expected, no abnormalities could be identified. For the sake of clarity of exposition, we do not present the results, however, they are available upon request. Instead, we investigate the case with 100 percent manipulation b) using the screening method. Since the manipulation period is unknown to the investigator, well an appropriate criterion for the choice of the window width is needed. We have run the screening with window widths from 1 day to 86 days. In order to identify the suspicious time period we look at the p-values. Table 1 reports all window widths, their starting and ending periods as well as the corresponding KS-statistic and the p-value. To save space we only show cases that are significant at a 99% level (p<0.01). As can be seen in Table 1 , all statistically significant windows are in the manipulation period. This is shown in Figure 4 The aim of this section was to illustrate the application of the screening method introduced in this paper. It can be shown that the test identifies manipulation periods sufficiently well. 9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26 
b. Results
In order to detect whether price manipulations on German power markets occur, we used the earlier introduced methodology. Thereby, we need to run a sequence of KS-tests over rolling sub-periods. However, in our case, in addition to manipulation phases, we first need to estimate the length of window w. Assuming that we are only able to detect manipulated prices if they occur for a certain period, we set a minimum window to w=30 days (~1 month) and step of 1 day. In order to be able to detect possible long-term manipulations we increased w from 30 to 750 days, to cover possible manipulations from 1 month up to 2 years.
Our results are presented in Table 3 . We identify five suspicious phases ( level. However, the windows that are significant at 5%-10% levels are not shown in Table 3 .
It is worth noticing that no windows wider than 2 months were highly significant. That means we find no hint on long-term inconstancies. 
VI. Conclusion
Our paper develops a market screening model to detect inconstancies in price changes.
Following requirements for systematic and ubiquitous market screenings of Harrington (2005, 2008) , we present a robust model to detect inconstancies systematically. Our nonparametric rolling window approach can be used, e.g., for generating the initial suspicion of a collusive period. In this paper, we illustrate our approach with a short market simulation in a common energy market setup including merit-order effects. We find, that the power of the results highly depend on the strength and length of the manipulation period itself. insignificant. However, manipulations can be detected if they hold up at least one month, using daily data. Further research would be to apply the proposed model to other markets. Thereby an application to other data is possible as well. For instance, antitrust agencies (or other institutions) may access capacity utilization or financial data. Moreover, taking into account macroeconomic events, such as a phase of the business cycle, could be useful. However, this paper shows how our model could easily be used in a general screening. In addition, there is a necessity for further developments concerning the proposed methods for model validation.
